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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Conversation Analysis Methodology 
 
 
In this chapter I will illustrate the basic principles of Conversation Analysis 
(CA) using extracts mostly from ordinary conversation; data will not be presented 
from the language classroom1 (L2 classroom) until later chapters so that I am able to 
highlight similarities and differences. Ordinary conversation has a “baseline” status in 
CA (Sacks et al., 1974) and L2 classroom interaction will be portrayed in chapters 2 
to 5 as a variety of institutional discourse. It is essential to specify very explicitly the 
principles which underlie ordinary conversation in order to have a firm foundation on 
which to analyse talk in the institutional setting of L2 classrooms around the world.  
This chapter explains the relationship between ethnomethodology and CA, 
outlining five fundamental principles which underlie ethnomethodology and hence 
CA. After outlining the aims and principles of CA, I introduce the interactional 
organisations of sequence (adjacency pairs), preference, turn-taking and repair. I then 
explain the typical analytical procedures followed in CA and introduce the CA 
perspective on context. The chapter concludes with the argument that a “linguistic” 
version of CA has diverged from ethnomethodological CA. 
 
1.1 History and Development of CA 
 
A detailed history of the development of ethnomethodology and CA is not 
relevant to the discussion and may be found elsewhere2. Very briefly, however, the 
principal originator of CA was Harvey Sacks, who worked at the University of 
California until his accidental death in 1975. It appears that his innovation was due to 
the convergence of three factors. Firstly, his acquaintance with Harold Garfinkel, the 
key figure in ethnomethodology. Secondly, Sack's decision to investigate the 
organisation of social interaction by analysing naturally occurring mundane talk. 
Thirdly, the new technology of audio recording, which enabled this analysis to take 
place. The idea with which Sacks was working was that there is 'order at all points' in 
interaction, i.e. that talk in interaction is systematically organized and deeply ordered 
and methodic. This was an extremely radical idea in the 1960s as audio recording was 
only just emerging, conversation had not yet been studied and the dominant linguistic 
view was the Chomskian one that "ordinary talk could not be the object of study for 
linguistics since it is too disordered; it is an essentially degenerate realization of 
linguistic competence" (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 22).  
A recurrent theme in this chapter will be the fundamental differences 
between CA methodology and approaches typical of linguistics. The seminal texts on 
CA have been written by sociologists3 and, as Heritage (1984b, p. 234) notes, CA 
studies have been presented in a style which presumes a competent audience and 
features of the style make access to their methods and findings difficult; this is doubly 
the case with writings on ethnomethodology. It needs first to be understood that CA 
was started by Harvey Sacks as a sociological "naturalistic observational discipline 
that could deal with the details of social action rigorously, empirically and formally." 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, pp. 289-90).  
In the course of this chapter I will try to explicate why CA methodology 
proceeds as it does and why, in spite of some fundamental differences with linguistics 
methodology, it is a suitable methodology for applied linguists to use. These 
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differences will be teased out during the course of this chapter. At the start, however, 
we should be clear that there is a fundamental difference between the “CA mentality” 
and the “linguistic mentality” in relation to the status of language.  CA's primary 
interest is in the social act whereas a linguist's primary interest in normally in 
language: 
 
CA is only marginally interested in language as such; its actual object of 
study is the interactional organization of social activities. CA is a radical 
departure from other forms of linguistically oriented analysis in that the 
production of utterances, and more particularly the sense they obtain, is 
seen not in terms of the structure of language, but first and foremost as a 
practical social accomplishment. That is, words used in talk are not 
studied as semantic units, but as products or objects which are designed 
and used in terms of the activities being negotiated in the talk. (Hutchby 




The basic relationship between ethnomethodology and CA is that the first 
subsumes the second; ethnomethodology studies the principles on which people base 
their social actions, whilst CA focuses more narrowly on the principles which people 
use to interact with each other by means of language. Ethnomethodology is not well 
known outside the area; the writings of ethnomethodologists tend to be difficult to 
access and Boyle (1997, p. 29) notes that Garfinkel "established a standard of 
obscurity that most ethnomethodologists seem compelled to follow." Nonetheless, it 
is especially important for linguists to understand the fundamental principles of 
ethnomethodology since, as we have already noted, ethnomethodology and CA4 are in 
many ways very different to approaches typically used in linguistics. What is 
ethnomethodology and why should it be used as the basis of the study of human 
interaction when it is not a linguistic discipline? One way to understand the project of 
ethnomethodology and CA is to imagine that an alien has been sent from a civilisation 
which is totally different to ours and which does not have the concept of language as 
we know it; they may communicate in images by telepathy, for example, and find 
language puzzlingly indirect, ambiguous and primitive. The alien's brief is to 
understand and describe the basis of human behaviour and communication. Our 
project is to explain to the alien the principles according to which people act and use 
language to interact.  
According to Heritage (1984b, p. 4) "The term 'ethnomethodology' refers to 
the study of … the body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures 
and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense 
of, find their way about in, and act on the cirumstances in which they find 
themselves." Ethno methods can be seen as the interpretative procedures used by 
social actors in situ. Garfinkel's work can be seen as a reaction to the previously 
dominant top-down Parsonian5 sociology, which assumed the superiority of the 
sociologist's knowledge over that of members of society, who were seen as cultural 
and psychological “dopes” who unthinkingly acted out the macro rules of society as 
explicated by the sociologist. Garfinkel, however, rejected analytical frameworks 
which assume the superiority of social science knowledge over the lay social actor's 
knowledge and sought an answer to the question: "how do social actors come to 
know, and know in common, what they are doing and the circumstances in which they 
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are doing it?" (Heritage, 1984, p. 76). This can be understood as a rejection of an etic 
or external analyst's perspective on human behaviour in favour of an emic or 
participant's perspective. Since the emic/etic distinction is vital to this monograph, we 
need to define it at this point. According to Pike: 
 
The etic viewpoint studies behaviour as from outside of a particular 
system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. The emic 
viewpoint results from studying behaviour as from inside the system… 
Descriptions or analyses from the etic standpoint are 'alien' in view, 
with criteria external to the system. Emic descriptions provide an 
internal view, with criteria chosen from within the system. (Pike, 1967, 
p. 37) 
 
Garfinkel's assumption was that people must make normative use of a 
number of principles in order to display their actions to each other and allow others to 
make sense of them. However, these principles are used on a constant basis in 
everyday life and have become automatised to the extent that they have a taken-for-
granted or seen but unnoticed status which "entitle persons to conduct their common 
conversational affairs without interference." (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 42). Garfinkel was, 
then, trying to make explicit and visible those principles which we orient to in 
everyday life and of which we have implicit knowledge. The basic problem which 
Garfinkel faced was that of uncovering and identifying these normative practices; as 
they are seen but unnoticed they are not easily perceptible when the norms are being 
followed. However, he noticed that the norms did become more identifiable when the 
norms were being breached. In an uncharacteristically comprehensible sentence, 
Garfinkel (1967, p. 37) notes that "For these background expectancies to come into 
view one must either be a stranger to the "life as usual" character of everyday scenes, 
or become estranged from them." This point explains CA's interest in deviant case 
analysis, which will be discussed later. Garfinkel therefore devised a series of famous 
“breaching experiments” which are described in detail in Garfinkel (1967). In a 
counselling experiment, for example, subjects asked 10 questions for advice on 
personal problems to a “counsellor” hidden behind a screen; they were then given 
yes/no answers without any further explanation. 5 yes answers and 5 no answers were 
allocated on a completely random basis, unknown to the subjects. In spite of this, 
subjects were determined to make sense of the answers.  
Garfinkel designed experiments like these to breach the norms, to undermine 
the subject's belief in reciprocity of perspectives in which the conversational partner is 
co-operating in a shared reality or intersubjectivity. However, Garfinkel found, as in 
the case above, that this was extremely difficult to accomplish as subjects constantly 
made adjustments and found ways to maintain their belief in a shared reality in which 
both participants were orienting to the same norms. As Heritage (1984, p. 96) puts it: 
"At every possible point, the participants seemed to be willing to give the 'underlying 
pattern' the benefit of the doubt. They assumed it was operative despite appearances 
to the contrary and … they waited for the pattern to reassert itself in new evidences 
which would enable them to discount any prior discrepancies." Taken as a whole, 
these breaching experiments demonstrated that utterances in conversation are not 
treated literally but are understood by reference to context and assumptions about the 
other party, as part of an emerging sequence and with both retrospective and 
prospective significance, e.g., the significance of a question may emerge 
subsequently.  
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So in view of the vagueness and indexicality of conversational utterances, 
intersubjectivity between interactants can only be maintained if the interactants agree 
to fill-in all of the contextual detail and co-operate; this is similar to Grice's (1975) co-
operative principle. Therefore victims of breaching experiments (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967, 
p. 43) tend to react with “moral” outrage because the failure to co-operate "threatens 
the very possibility of mutual understanding and, with it, the existence of a shared 
world." (Heritage, 1984, p. 95). Breaches of the ethnomethodological principles in 
conversation are therefore said to be 'morally sanctionable'. Garfinkel (1967) reports 
that many of the students who undertook his breaching experiments experienced 
upsetting and very hostile reactions from friends and family as a result.  
 
1.3 The Principles of Ethnomethodology 
 
We will now introduce five fundamental and interlocked principles which 
underlie ethnomethodology6 and also CA, although they are rarely referred to 




 Of the ethnomethodological principles reviewed here, indexicality or context-
boundedness may be the most familiar. Interactants generally do not make every 
single aspect of their intended meaning explicit, relying on mutually understood 
features of the background context to supply additional information. According to 
Boyle (2000b, p. 31) ethnomethodology's unique contribution to the discussion of 
indexicality is that indexical knowledge is not just something in the environment but 
also something talked into being by interactants. In other words, they display through 
their utterances which aspects of context they are orienting to at any given time and 
there is a reflexive relationship between talk and context. This provides an analytical 
resource and underlies CA’s insistence that we invoke contextual features in analysis 
only when it is evident in the details of the interaction that the participants themselves 
are orienting to such features. There is also a clear link between indexicality and 
Garfinkel's breaching experiments. People cannot elaborate all aspects of what they 
are talking about because it is too time-consuming and difficult, so "Indexicality 
allows utterances to represent vastly more than is said and thereby makes mundane 
conversation possible." (Boyle, 2000a, pp. 32-33).  
 
The Documentary Method of Interpretation 
 
The documentary method of interpretation is central to ethnomethodology. It 
treats any actual real-world action as a 'document' or an example of a previously 
known pattern. There are similarities here with schema theory7. So in practical terms 
if anyone greets us by saying "Hi" we treat that action as a document and relate it to 
previously known patterns, normally identify it as a greeting and respond accordingly. 
Importantly, the claim is not only that this is the method of interpretation which 
interactants use, but also that this is the fundamental method which analysts must use 
in analysing social interaction as it is an emic methodology. It should also be noted 
that there is a reflexive relationship between the patterns and the individual actions so 
that if, for example, we encounter a new form of greeting, our underlying pattern or 
schema of forms of greeting is updated. In order to exemplify the documentary 
method of interpretation in practice, we will consider the following extract from a 
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staffroom discussion between three ESOL teachers in a language school in the UK. 
ESOL teachers commonly use nationality to index various characteristics of students, 
with southern Europeans thought to be talkative and East Asians thought to be quiet in 




1 Ed:  my: God it's quiet in there. 
2 Harry: hhhh 
3 Ed:  it's like working in a library in there. 
4 Harry: anyway (0.5) you've () 
5 Ed:  I can't get anything out of them. (1.0) it's-there are three 
6            Japanese students and 
7 Keith:         oh right. 
 
(Richards, 1996, p. 258) 
 
 Up to line 5 the listeners only know that the learners are quiet. On receipt of line 
6, however, using the documentary method of interpretation, Keith is able to match 
the quietness to a previously known pattern or schema and reach a new understanding 
of the situation, so his interruptive oh in line 7 marks a change of information state 
(Heritage, 1984a). When the documentary method of interpretation is applied to 
sequential interaction, its explanatory power becomes extremely significant. Any turn 
at talk (such as line 7) becomes a document or display of a cognitive, emotional and 
attitudinal state, an analysis of context and of the previous turn(s) in the sequence and 
a social action which renews the context. 
 
The Reciprocity of Perspectives 
 
     Another principle which social actors use involves a willingness to adopt a 
reciprocity of perspectives, i.e. to agree that we are following the same norms, to 
show affiliation to the other person's perspective and try to achieve intersubjectivity. 
This is closely linked to indexicality, which cannot function unless all parties can 
agree to index their interaction in the same way. This is demonstrated by Garfinkel's 
breaching experiments, which are simultaneously breaching indexicality and 
reciprocity of perspectives.  Recipients of the breaching react strongly because the 
breaches challenge the entire basis of intersubjectivity, in which indexical expressions 
can be used without elaboration. This principle does not mean that people actually 
succeed in reaching the same perspective on everything all of the time; this is 
obviously not the case. Rather, to follow the principle means to agree that we are 
following the same norms in interaction, including a structural bias towards co-
operation. In many ways this is similar to Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle.  
  This principle also functions as a constitutive norm and template for 
interpretation, so we are able to recognise that, in the case of a failure of 
intersubjectivity, that the failure has occurred by reference to the normal expectation 
of willingness to adopt  reciprocity of perspectives. This principle is also closely 
linked to preference organisation in CA, which can be seen as a structural bias 
towards affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives. The preferred action is seen but 
unnoticed, and promotes affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives, whereas the 
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dispreferred action is noticeable and accountable, may be sanctionable and works 
against affiliation and reciprocity of perspectives. 
 
 Normative Accountability 
 
The principle of the normative accountability of actions is perhaps the key to 
understanding the ethnomethodological basis of CA and also the one which is the 
furthest removed from linguistic concepts. At this point we should clarify the 
position on norms in ethnomethodology, which should be clearly differentiated from 
the descriptivist “rules and units” approach typical of linguistics. Norms are 
understood in ethnomethodology as constitutive of action rather than regulative. It is 
by reference to norms that interactants can design their own social actions and 
interpret those of others.   
For example, when one social actor greets another, a greeting response is the 
norm, or has seen but unnoticed status. Failure to respond in this case, however, may 
be noticeable, accountable and sanctionable. Here we use a norm of behaviour as a 
point of reference or action template for interpretation rather than a rule. An actor 
may decide to return a greeting, but "The actor who is determined to declare or 
continue a quarrel can do so by visibly refusing to return a greeting and leaving the 
other to draw the conclusion." (Heritage, 1984, p. 118). The norms are constitutive 
in that they constitute the setting in which the actions may be performed and 
interpreted. The seen but unnoticed route is that which is overwhelmingly used to 
accomplish everyday actions. We will see later in the chapter that the same situation 
applies to CA with respect to norms. CA states norms (or action templates) of 
conduct with respect to organisations of turn-taking, sequence, repair and 
preference. This does not mean that interactants have to slavishly follow these 
norms, but rather that these are points of reference by which we can design and 
perform our social actions, analyse and evaluate the conduct of another, draw 
conclusions and hold them accountable. So, for example, interactants can and do 
deviate from the norms, interrupt others or fail to provide the second part to an 
adjacency pair and fellow interactants can evaluate these actions as noticeable and 
accountable by reference to the norms. 
The four other ethnomethodological principles can be seen to constitute 
interlocking norms or background expectancies of behaviour, adherence to which 
enables social actors to carry on everyday action and interaction in a seen but 
unnoticed or normal way. The principle of normative accountability is the “moral 
force” which holds all the other principles together by providing a basis for 




  This term is widely used in the social sciences, but it has a very specific 
meaning in ethnomethodology. The principle of reflexivity states that the same set of 
methods or procedures are responsible for both the production of actions/utterances 
and their interpretation. This principle underlies the CA mechanism of the adjacency 
pair. Staying with the greeting-greeting adjacency pair, the principle would be 
manifested as follows. If two acquaintances approach each other along a corridor for 
the first time one morning and one issues a greeting, then s/he has performed the first 
part of an adjacency pair. From the perspective of reflexivity, the greeter has not only 
performed an action but also created a context for its interpretation. If the other person 
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responds with a greeting, they have not only performed an action but also displayed 
an interpretation of the first action as a greeting. We can see the other 
ethnomethodological principles manifest in this example as well. By returning 
greetings, both interactants demonstrate that they are using the documentary method 
of interpretation, or that they are both orienting to the same schemata.  They further 
orient to indexicality in that they display understanding that the context requires a 
greeting to be performed. Reciprocity of perspectives is achieved in that both 
interactants have displayed a similar understanding of context. The principle of 
normative accountability of actions is manifest here in that failure to return a greeting 
will be noticeable, accountable and sanctionable9.  
  This concentration of fundamental principles into a very short and simple 
pair of actions perhaps explains why we become perplexed or annoyed if we greet 
other people and they fail to return the greeting. This failure is potentially 
sanctionable in that we may decide to retaliate, e.g. by snubbing that person in turn in 
future. There is also a semiotic sense in which an exchange of greetings is an initial 
declaration of mutual orientation to the ethnomethodological principles. Failure to do 
so may be a semiotic indicator of social trouble looming. It should be stressed that 
these norms are not prescriptive and restrictive rules, but rather the means or points of 
reference by which we can express social actions and others can interpret them. We 
are not obliged to follow the seen but unnoticed route and be affiliative. Indeed, we 
may sometimes decided that we want to display a total lack of affiliation to someone 
and demonstrate that we do not reciprocate any perspectives with them. In this case it 
is precisely by reference to the norms that we display our attitude to this person, 
namely by deliberately going against the norms. For example, on receipt of an 
invitation to the person's house, we may proclaim "What? Go to your house? I'd rather 
die!"  In the same way, (using the principle of reflexivity) recipients interpret our 
display by reference to the norms. 
 
1.4 Aims of CA 
 
From one perspective, CA is the result of applying ethnomethodological 
principles to naturally occurring talk. Talk-in-interaction has become the accepted 
superordinate term to refer to the object of CA research (Drew and Heritage, 1992, p. 
4). According to Psathas (1995), CA studies the organisation and order of social 
action in interaction. This organisation and order is one produced by the interactants 
in situ and oriented to by them. The analyst's task is to develop an emic perspective, 
to uncover and describe this organization and order; the main interest is in uncovering 
the underlying machinery which enables interactants to achieve this organisation and 
order: 
 
Our aim is … to get into a position to transform … our view of what 
happened here as some interaction that could be treated as the thing we're 
studying, to interactions being spewed out by a machinery, the machinery 
being what we're trying to find; where, in order to find it we've got to get 
a whole bunch of its products. (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, p. 169)  
 
  So one principal aim is to characterise the organisation of the interaction 
by abstracting from exemplars of specimens of interaction and to uncover the emic 
logic underlying the organisation. A common misconception is that CA is obsessed 
with micro detail and has nothing to say about interactional organisation on a larger 
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scale. This monograph, however, portrays the interactional architecture of the L2 
classroom. Another principal aim of CA is to trace the development of 
intersubjectivity in an action sequence. This does not mean that CA provides access to 
participants' cognitive or psychological states10. Rather, it means that analysts trace 
how participants analyse and interpret each others' actions and develop a shared 
understanding of the progress of the interaction. So CA practitioners aim "to discover 
how participants understand and respond to one another in their turns at talk, with a 
central focus on how sequences of action are generated." (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 
1998, p. 14)  
 
1.5 Principles of CA 
 
We previously reviewed the basic principles underlying ethnomethodology. 
These are generic principles which may be used to study any kind of human action; 
CA focuses solely on human actions which are manifested through talk11. Therefore, 
CA has developed its own subset of principles and procedures, which will now be 
discussed; their links back to ethnomethodological principles will be traced where 
appropriate. As with other forms of qualitative research, the principles are not to be 
considered as a formula or to be applied in a mechanistic fashion. It is essential to 
adopt a conversation analytic mentality which  “involves more a cast of mind, or a 
way of seeing, than a static and prescriptive set of instructions which analysts bring to 
bear on the data." (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 94).  
Sacks's most original idea, according to Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998), is that 
there is order at all points in interaction. This can be traced back to Garfinkel’s view 
of people as rational actors who take active decisions rather than being passive 
"dopes". As already noted, this was an extremely radical idea in the 1960s as the 
dominant linguistic view was that conversation was too disordered to be studied. This 
idea leads to the concept of  rational design in interaction, that is that talk in 
interaction is systematically organised,  deeply ordered and methodic. When we speak 
of the rational organisation of interaction, this does not in any way imply that 
everything a speaker says seems rational or logical to everyone else, but rather that 
interaction is structurally organised. The principle of rational organisation (explored 
in Chapter 5) is vital to an understanding of institutional discourse. Different 
institutions have different institutional aims and organisations of the interaction 
appropriate to those aims. 
A second principle of CA is that contributions to interaction are context-
shaped and context-renewing. Contributions are context-shaped in that they cannot be 
adequately understood except by reference to the sequential environment in which 
they occur and in which the participants design them to occur. Contributions are 
context-renewing in that they inevitably form part of the sequential environment in 
which a next contribution will occur. As Heritage  (1984, p. 242) puts it, “The context 
of a next action is repeatedly renewed with every current action,” and is transformable 
at any moment. This principle can be traced to Garfinkels' principles of indexicality, 
reflexivity and the documentary method of interpretation; see section 1.3. 
The third principle is that no order of detail can be dismissed, a priori, as 
disorderly, accidental or irrelevant (Heritage 1984b, p. 241). This principle follows 
from the first two and can be seen to underlie the development of the highly detailed 
CA transcription system, its minute analysis of the detail of naturally occurring data 
and its highly empirical orientation. There is a great deal to be said on the matter of 
transcription and there are inevitably some differences between linguists (particularly 
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phonologists) and CA  practitioners here. However, since these issues are not of 
central relevance to the argument here, the reader is referred to the detailed 
discussions in ten Have (1999), Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998), and Markee (2000). 
For  illustrations of the benefits of CA transcription, see Wei (2002) and Hutchby and 
Wooffitt (1998). For present purposes we need only note the following. 
 
• CA practitioners regard the recordings of naturally occurring interaction as the 
primary data  
• Transcripts are designed to make the primary data available for intensive 
analytic consideration by the analyst and other readers.  
• Transcripts are inevitably incomplete, selective renderings of the primary data 
which invariably involve a trade-off between readability and 
comprehensiveness 
 
The fourth principle which follows from this is that analysis is bottom-up and 
data driven; we should not approach the data with any prior theoretical assumptions or 
assume that any background or contextual detail are relevant. So in CA it is not 
relevant to invoke power, gender, race or any other contextual factor unless and until 
there is evidence in the details of the interaction that the participants themselves are 
orienting to them.  This relates back to ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity. 
In Seedhouse (1998a), for example, I examined interaction in German between a 
female Greek immigrant to Germany (NNS) conversing with a German shop worker 
(NS) who was delivering soft drinks to her flat. At one point the native speaker says: 
"Achsoo, Vater kommen, ja." which may be roughly translated as "Oh well, father 
come, yes." I argue that NS is orienting to the NNS’s trouble with the L2 by producing 
minimalised, pidginised interlanguage forms himself, which is a form of modified 
speech or accommodation. From the CA perspective, it now and only now becomes 
valid to discuss the identities of native-speaker and non-native-speaker or to speak of a 
cross-cultural encounter because there is now evidence that the participants are 
orienting to such constructs in the details of their talk12. So it is incorrect to say that CA 
does not consider background or contextual details; the point is that it does so only if 
and when close analysis reveals participants' orientation to such details (see sections 1.8 
and  2.6 for further discussion). 
Another way of presenting the principles of CA is in relation to the questions 
which it asks. The essential question which we must ask at all stages of CA analysis 
of data is "Why that, in that way, right now?" This encapsulates the perspective of 
interaction as action (why that) which is expressed by means of linguistic forms (in 
that way) in a developing sequence (right now). Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 99) 
suggest that there are "… two core analytic questions in CA: What interactional 
business is being mediated or accomplished through the use of a sequential pattern? 
How do participants demonstrate their active orientation to this business?"  
Alternatively, Ten Have (1999, p. 15) proposes that CA's basic analytic strategy is to 
consider any point in the data and try to find out the kind of problem for which doing 
this might be a solution. This strategy emphasises the social action orientation of CA 
and considers what the interactants are trying to achieve in terms of social actions. 
Sack's early lectures were often labelled to express this, e.g. How to avoid giving help 
without refusing to give it (treat the circumstance as a joke). 
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1.6 Types of Interactional Organisation 
 
We will now look at four different but related types of interactional 
organisation which were uncovered by Sacks and associates by grappling with their 
data and which can now be employed in analysis by CA practitioners. We will 
attempt to relate these back to the principles of ethnomethodology where appropriate. 
First we should clarify that these organisations are definitely not the same as 'units of 
analysis' in the linguistic sense. Rather, they should be understood as interactional 
organisations which interactants use normatively and reflexively both as an action 
template for the production of their social actions and as a point of reference for the 
interpretation of their actions. We as analysts should use them in the same way. The 
organisations are part of the context-free machinery which we make use of to 
orientate ourselves in indexical interaction i.e. we employ them in a context-sensitive 
way. Similarly, we are only able to interpret the context-sensitive social actions of 
others because there is a context-free machinery by reference to which we can make 




The concept of the adjacency pair is one which (if considered purely as a 
structural phenomenon) may appear to be so obvious and superficial that it is hardly 
worth mentioning. However, the action sequence or sequence organisation is the 
essential key to understanding how CA analysis works and its links to its 
ethnomethodological roots13. Therefore we will need to spend some time considering 
the adjacency pair as the most common and prevalent manifestation of the concept of 
linked actions in an action sequence. These are, as Heritage (1984b, p. 256) puts it, 
"the basic building-blocks of intersubjectivity." There are of course a number of other 
possible sequence organisations, which cannot be dealt with here for reasons of space. 
Adjacency pairs are paired utterances such that on production of the first part of the 
pair (e.g. question) the second part of the pair (answer) becomes conditionally 
relevant. If, however, the second part is not immediately produced, it may nonetheless 





1 A : can I have a bottle of Mich?  Q1 
2 B: are you over twenty-one?  Q2 
3 A: no.     A2 
4 B: no     A1 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 304) 
 
In the above extract in a liquor store A is not old enough to buy beer and one 
question-answer adjacency pair (lines 2 and 3) is embedded in another (lines 1 and 4). 
What this sequence also demonstrates is that action sequences do not necessarily 
unroll in a linear fashion (Q1-A1, Q2-A2) and hence that serial order is not 
necessarily the same thing as sequential order. When this is the case, the different 
types of interactional organisation (here, adjacency pair and turn-taking) combine in a 
mutually reinforcing fashion to provide normative points of reference which enable 
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interactants (and analysts) to orientate themselves. Furthermore, the adjacency pair 
concept does not claim that second parts are always provided for first parts. Rather, it 
is a normative frame of reference which provides a framework for understanding 
actions and providing accountability. So if we ask a question to someone who does 
not then provide an answer, we may draw conclusions about that person. Deviant case 
analysis is used in CA to confirm the normative character of identified organisations. 
In the case of adjacency pairs, we can demonstrate this by examining the following 





1 A:  is there something bothering you or not? 
   (1.0) 
2 A:  yes or no 
   (1.5) 
3 A:  eh? 




1 Child:  have to cut the:se Mummy. 
   (1.3) 
2 Child:  won't we Mummy 
   (1.5) 
3 Child:  won't we 
4 Mother: yes. 
 
The above extracts contain deviant cases because an answer has become 
conditionally relevant after the question but no answer has been received, nor has the 
lack of an answer been accounted for; the second part is therefore noticeably absent 
and accountable. That this is also A's and the child's analysis in extracts 1.3 and 1.4 is 
demonstrated by their repetition and re-repetition of their questions. The longer the 
second part remains absent, the more accountable and sanctionable it becomes14. This 
is evidenced by the increasingly short and curt linguistic forms which are used to 
express the first and second repetitions of their questions. This is an example of CA 
analysts' interest in linguistic forms; the interest is not in the linguistic forms 
themselves, but rather in the way in which they are used to embody and express subtle 
differences in social actions. We encountered in section 1.5 the fundamental CA 
question "Why this, in this way, right now?" If we look at line 3 in extracts 1.3 and 
1.4 we can obtain clear answers to these questions. The questioner in both cases is 
insisting on receiving an answer to a previously posed question, using increasingly 
curt linguistic forms and at this point in the action sequence because the two previous 
questions have not received the relevant second part.  The extracts also demonstrate 
that questioners orient to their questions having a normative force with sequential 
implications which prompt the recipient to provide a second part or alternatively to 
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C: Yes can you tell me please if air ukay three ni:nety is coming in at  
             fifteen twenty five still 
A: I’m sorry we’re british airways (we) don’t handle air ukay 
 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 249) 
 
It now needs to be understood that the principles which underlie this 
straightforward analysis of adjacency pairs are the same ones which are used in much 
larger and more complex sequences; we will see in Chapter 5 that they underlie the 
analysis of interaction in the L2 classroom as well. The principles are as follows. A 
first action is analysed as projecting the production of a relevant next action by next 
speaker. If the relevant next action occurs next turn, it is treated in a seen but 
unnoticed fashion by first speaker as norms have been adhered to. The relevant action 
may not occur next turn but its noticeable absence may be accounted for (as in extract 
1.5 above) by next speaker. However, if the next action is not produced by next 
speaker and no account is provided, this absence can be treated as noticeable, 
accountable and sanctionable by next speaker. The longer it is absent, the more 
sanctionable it becomes. So in extracts 1.3 and 1.4 any further silences on the parts of 
B and Mother might, for example, result in the throwing of an object (in the case of 
A) or a tantrum (in the case of Child). It is perfectly possible for speakers to deviate 
from norms, but listeners may negatively evaluate these observable behaviours and 
take sanctions against them.  
Following a first turn, the interaction continues sequentially, with the second 
speaker's action creating expectations for subsequent speakers and so on. Moving on 
to the third turn, this displays an analysis of the second speaker's turn, so second 
speaker is able to determine how their turn has been interpreted. So the essence of CA 
is the concept of action sequences or sequence organisation, which has been 
exemplified by the adjacency pair. However, interaction clearly does not consist of an 
endless succession of adjacency pairs. The point being made is nevertheless that 
interaction is always an action sequence in which "a turn's talk will be heard as 
directed to a prior turn's talk, unless special techniques are used to locate some other 
talk to which it is directed." (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 728).  
The adjacency pair has been used as an example of a generic phenomenon, 
namely next-positioning and linked actions within sequence organisation. The 
adjacency pair is not only an action template with normative force, it is also a 
template for interpretation. Extrapolating from this, any first action in interaction is an 
action template which creates a normative expectation for a next action and a template 
for interpreting it. The second action displays an interpretation of the first action and 
itself creates an action and interpretational template for subsequent actions, and so on. 
This can also be termed the next-turn proof procedure (Sacks et al., 1974: 729) which 
is the basic tool which analysts can use to develop an emic perspective. The next turn, 
then, documents an analysis of the previous turn and displays this analysis not only to 
the other interactants, but also to us as analysts, providing us with a proof criterion 
and search procedure. This procedure can be traced back to the ethnomethodological 
principle of reflexivity which states that the same set of methods or procedures are 
responsible for both the production of actions/language and its interpretation.  
We can now see that this is reflexive on further levels. Sequence organisation 
is the mechanism by which interactants are able to make their utterances 
comprehensible and by which co- interactants are able to interpret them. However, it 
is also the mechanism by which analysts are able to analyse the course of the 
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interaction, using data which are publicly available. This does not mean, however, 
that we gain a direct window into what interactants “really mean” or their cognitive 
state15. We are rather gaining a direct window into how social actors perform a series 
of related social actions via the medium of language and into the progress of their 
intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is mutual understanding or interpersonal alignment 
and one of the key objectives of CA is to explicate how we are able to achieve a 
shared understanding of each other’s actions. The CA perspective is that we are able 
to orientate ourselves by normative reference to interactional organisations. 
Adjacency pairs (and sequence organisation) are therefore called the building blocks 
of intersubjectivity because interactants use them to display to one another their 
understanding of each others' turns and this permits analysts to follow the progress of 




1 A: where’s Bill? 
2 J: there’s a yellow VW outside Sue’s house 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 102)  
 
The production of a first turn provides an interpretative basis for first speaker 
to interpret the next speaker's actions. Here the second part is interpreted as a tentative 
answer to A’s question rather than an unconnected observation. However, it can be 
interpreted in this way solely by virtue of its sequential location after the first part of 
an adjacency pair. Perhaps CA's major contribution to pragmatics is that utterances 
derive much of their pragmatic force from their sequential location and through their 
relationship to the interactional organisations uncovered by CA. A typical "linguistic" 
misunderstanding of adjacency pairs is that they are part of a descriptivist system of 
units and rules which are etically specifiable. For example, Burns (2001, p. 134) 
suggests that "A weakness of CA resides in the fact that we still do not have precise 




At this point we will introduce the notion of preference, which issues from the 
organisation of the adjacency pair. The concept has been frequently misunderstood, as 
Boyle (2000a) demonstrates. It should be clear to readers who have followed the 
argument so far that this is not related to the notion of liking or wanting to do 
something, but rather involves issues of affiliation and disaffiliation, of seeing, 
noticeability, accountability and sanctionability in relation to social actions and hence 
the concept derives directly from ethnomethodological principles. From this 
perspective, interaction should be understood as a business primarily of social actors 
aiming to achieve social goals (rather than engaged in the production of language) 
with the interaction rationally organised to help actors to achieve those goals. Next-
positioning is the major means by which speakers can exert influence over the actions 
of their interactional partners and the institutionalised norm is for interaction to be 
affiliative, i.e. to achieve reciprocity of perspectives and to enable social actors to 
achieve their goals.  
As Heritage (1984b, p. 265) puts it, "… there is a 'bias' intrinsic to many 
aspects of the organisation of talk which is generally favourable to the maintenance of 
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bonds of solidarity between actors and which promotes the avoidance of conflict." 
This is similar in concept to Grice's (1975) co-operative principle.  This should be no 
surprise in terms of the “rational” design of interaction, in that the underlying 
ethnomethodological principles such as reflexivity, reciprocity of perspectives and the 
documentary method of interpretation are strongly affiliative. This structural bias 
manifests itself in preference organisation. For many adjacency pairs there are 
alternative second parts, so an invitation may be answered by an acceptance 
(preferred action) or a rejection (dispreferred action). These two options are 
performed in different ways (Pomerantz, 1984). Preferred actions are normally 





1 Child:  could you .hh could you put on the light for my .hh room 
2 Father:  yep 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 307) 
 
Dispreferred responses are generally accompanied by hesitation and delay 
and are often prefaced by markers such as well or uh as well as by positive comments 
and appreciations, e.g., "You're very kind". They are frequently mitigated in some 
way and accounted for by an explanation or excuse of some kind. A’s turn in the 




1: B: uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little while this morning 
2:  I'll give you a cup of coffee. 
3: A: hehh well that's awfully sweet of you, I don’t think I can make it 
4:  this morning. hh uhm I'm running an ad in the paper and -and uh I 
5:  have to stay near the phone. 
 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 58) 
 
As Heritage (1984b, p. 269) demonstrates, the preferred responses to actions 
are affiliative and conducive to social solidarity, whereas dispreferred responses are 
disaffiliative. This does not mean that the function of agreement is always preferred. 
In the case of self-deprecating first turns (e.g. "God I'm stupid") the preferred 
response is disagreement, for example. At this point we need to refer back to our 
previous discussion of ethnomethodology. The preferred response is the one which 
follows the established norms, is socially affiliative and promotes reciprocity of 
perspectives. So an acceptance to an invitation follows the norms, is the default way 
of behaving and is socially affiliative and hence is "seen but unnoticed". The seen but 
unnoticed route is that which is overwhelmingly used to accomplish everyday actions. 
A refusal of an invitation is disaffiliative, does not follow the norms and hence is 
dispreferred. This means that it is noticeable and accountable, which is the reason 
why dispreferred actions are so frequently accompanied by accounts and excuses. 
However, if the dispreferred action is packaged so as to minimise the degree of 
disaffiliation and conflict (see the discussion of invitation rejections below) then it is 
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not normally sanctionable. By contrast, providing an immediate, bald and unmitigated 
no as a reply to an invitation will be treated as sanctionable because it is failing to 
provide an account and making no attempt to minimise the degree of disaffiliation. 













"Seen but unnoticed"          Noticeable and                                     Noticeable, 
            accountable, but                                   accountable, 
                        not sanctionable                                  and sanctionable 
                                                                                                 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of preference. Boyle, 2000a, p. 590.  Reprinted with  
permission from Elsevier. 
 
So with the preferred pathway (acceptance in this case), no account is 
necessary, as the norms are being followed. With the noticeable and accountable but 
not sanctionable  pathway, (rejection with mitigation and an account in this case) an 
account is provided and so affiliation is not threatened and sanctions unnecessary. 
With the noticeable, accountable and sanctionable pathway, (immediate, bald, 
unmitigated rejection) the dispreferred action has been performed without an account 
so disaffiliation has occurred and sanctions or reprisals become relevant, e.g. no more 
invitations for him!  
We are now in a position to move on to the rational design of preferred and 
dispreferred seconds and attempt to explain why it is that the two types of turn are 
designed in different ways, with accounts and delays built into dispreferred turns. A 
preferred second is the seen but unnoticed or default response and is performed 
immediately as there is nothing to hold the interaction up and the actors can move 
onto the next action.  As Heritage (1984b, p. 270-273) notes, invitations are 
overwhelmingly rejected on the basis of inability (e.g. prior engagement) rather than 
unwillingness. An inability account has a “no fault” quality which is affiliative, does 
not threaten face16 and therefore minimises the degree of disaffiliation inherent in 
carrying out a dispreferred action. As far as the use of delays and markers such as well 
and uh are concerned, they are rationally linked to the production of accounts in that 
they allow time for recipients to think of accounts and excuses to mitigate the 
dispreferred action. Moreover, they allow time for the first speaker to perform two 
affiliative actions which could minimise the disaffiliation or loss of face caused by a 
rejection. The first of these is to modify the invitation into a more acceptable form as 
in line 5 of the extract below. 
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Extract 1.8 
 
1 A oh I was gonna sa:y if you wanted to:,= .hh you could meet me 
2  at UCB and I could show you some of the other things on  
3  the compu:ter 
4  (.) 




The second is to allow the first speaker to “help” with the production of the 
rejection in some way, as in the extract below, which invites the production of an 




     E: wanna come down have a bite of lunch with me?= I've got some beer 
and stuff 
  (0.3) 
N:  well you're real sweet hon uhm 
  (0.1) 
E: → or do you have something else 
 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 253) 
 
Delay, then, provides time for both interactants to take further measures to 
minimise the degree of disaffiliation caused by a dispreferred second turn. I will 
briefly mention pre-sequences, which are closely linked to the concepts of the 




1 A: whatcha doin? 
2 B: nothin' 
3 A: wanna drink? 
 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 253) 
 
Line 1 can be seen as a preliminary sequence which determines whether B is 
in principle amenable to an invitation. From the point of view of preference, it 
minimises the likelihood that a dispreferred rejection will be produced on receipt of 
an invitation and is therefore affiliative. Pre-sequences are pairs which function as 
preparation for a future pair, e.g. pre-closings, pre-announcements, pre-questions, pre-
requests. They often function in the way illustrated above to pre-empt the need for the 
production of a dispreferred action.  
So far I have focussed on the organisation of sequence, introducing the 
adjacency pair as an example of sequence organisation. Preference organisation 
explains the structural bias manifest in the alternative second parts of adjacency pairs. 
The next section explains how turn-taking is organised within sequences.  
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Turn-taking 
 
The exchange of turns is obviously characteristic of ordinary conversation; 
what is not so obvious is how it is accomplished so efficiently. Less than 5% of 
speech (in most contexts) is delivered with overlap, and gaps between speakers are 
generally measured in tenths of a second. Non-verbal communication cannot explain 
this, since telephone conversations are actually accomplished with more precise 
timing than face-to-face conversation (Levinson, 1983, p. 296). The system for 
turn-taking must be extremely robust, since it works whoever or however many 
people are speaking and whatever the length or topic of the conversation is. The 
following is a simplified version of Sacks et al.'s seminal (1974) account of the 
organisation of turn taking. There is a mechanism governing turn-taking which is 
termed a local management system; this means that decisions can be made by the 
participants, rather than having the turns allocated in advance (pre-allocated), as is the 
case in a courtroom.  
There is a set of norms with options which the participants can select. The 
basis of the system is turn-constructional units or TCUs, units which can be 
sentences, clauses or words. I will discuss the nature of TCUs in detail below. 
Listeners project, then, when a speaker is going to finish a turn, and the point at which 
speaker change may occur is known as the transition relevance place or TRP.  At a 
TRP the norms governing transition of speakers come into play; the speakers may 
change at that point, but they do not necessarily do so. These norms apply at the first 
TRP of any turn: 
 
a) If current speaker selects the next speaker in the current turn, then the current 
speaker must stop speaking and the next speaker must speak. 
b) If the current speaker does not select a next speaker, then any other participant may 
select themselves as next speaker: the first person to speak at the TRP gains rights to 
the next turn. 
c) If the current speaker has not selected a next speaker, and if no other participant 
self-selects as per section b), then the current speaker may (but need not) continue. 
The procedure then loops or recycles until the end of the conversation, for which there 
are of course further norms. 
 
  Schegloff (2000a) discusses the organisation of overlap and introduces an 
overlap resolution device as a component of the organisation of turn-taking. Overlap 
occurs for a number of reasons and in a number of ways. As we saw with sequence 
organisation, the system of turn-taking is normative, so speakers may choose to 
perform specific social actions “by reference to one-party-at-a-time, even though they 




A: why don't you come up and see me some[ times 
B:        [ I would like to 
 
(Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 58)       
 
  It is quite common for preferred, affiliative second turns such as 
acceptance of an invitation or agreement (as in the extract above) to be undertaken in 
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overlap before the transition relevance point.  In these cases it is precisely by 
normative reference to the norms of turn-taking and the TRP that interactants index 




C:  we:ll I wrote what I thought was a a-a  
    rea:son[ able explanatio:n 
F:               [ I: think it was a very rude le:tter. 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 299) 
 
 In the above extract, F begins his/her turn in the middle of reasonable. This 
cannot be considered a TRP, so it must be an interruption. This is confirmed by the 
disaffiliative social action embodied in F's turn, which directly contradicts first 
speaker and the bald linguistic formatting, with no attempt at mitigation. This extract 
illustrates that the norms of turn-taking can be broken; doing so has consequences for 
the progress of the interaction and social relations. Overlap, then, may be designedly 
used to intensify the affiliative or disaffiliative nature of particular social actions. 
However, it is also common to find overlap occurring at TRPs in accordance with the 




D:  he's got to talk to someone (very sor) supportive way  
 towards you (.) 
A:  [ Greg's (got wha-)] 
G:     [  think  you      sh-] think you should have one to: hold him 
 
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979, p. 44) 
 
 In this case A and G make a competing first start at the TRP, following the 
norms. A leaves the floor to G, who then repeats the start of his/her turn (think you) as 




B:   I ordered some paint from you uh a couple  
  of weeks ago some vermilion 
A:   yuh 
B:   and I wanted to order some more the name's Boyd 
A:  → yes [ how many tubes would you like sir 
B:      →           [ an- 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 305) 
 
Here, B starts a turn at a possible TRP, in that A's yes is a complete TCU and 
the turn could end at this point. When the overlap indicates that current speaker is in 
fact continuing, B follows the norms by ceding the turn. 
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We will now return to the phenomenon which perhaps best exemplifies the 
differing attitudes of CA and linguistics to language, namely that of the turn-
constructional unit or TCU.  It is common for readers from a linguistics background 
to find the characterisations of the TCU in the sociological literature (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1996; Ten Have, 1999) rather 
perplexing, as they are phrased in semi-linguistic terms but do not appear to fit in with 
any linguistic system. In this section, therefore, we will emphasise the difference 
between CA and linguistics. A TCU can be understood as a single social action 
performed in a turn or sequence and the projectable end of a TCU is a transition 
relevance place (TRP). A single social action can be manifested in a wide variety of 
language forms, from a single word or discourse marker or a clause to a sentence, as 
we can see in the examples below. A TCU can also be performed non-verbally (Ten 
Have, 1999, p. 112).  A TCU is essentially a social concept rather than a linguistic one 
and cannot therefore be delimited in linguistic terms. Since it is an emic or 
participant’s concept, it cannot be specified in etic terms. The discussion of extracts 




1  A: it would bum you out to kiss me then, [hunh 
2  B:          [yeah well we all  
3   know where that's at. 
4   ((pause)) 
5  A: [(             ) 
6  B: [I mean you went- you went through a- a long rap on that  
7   one.= 
8 → A: =yeah, so I say that would bum you out then, hunh 
 
(Sacks et al., 1974)    
 
According to Sacks et al., any turn performs three kinds of sequential work, 
which can be thought of in terms of past, present and future. A turn shows how it fits 
into the sequence so far (past), performs its own social action or contribution to the 
sequence (present) and thus provides a context for the next turn by another interactant 
(future). In extract 1.15 above, A's single turn in line 8 consists of three TCUs. 
“Yeah” relates in the past to B’s turn in lines 6 and 7. “So I say that would bum you 
out then” performs a social action which contributes to the sequence. “Hunh” looks 
forward and hands the turn back to B. So these three kinds of sequential work are 
separated out into three separate TCUs which are quite heterogenous in linguistic 




1  Marsha: en Ilene is going to meet im:. becuz the to:p  wz ripped 
2   off'v iz car which is tih say someb'ddy helped th'mselfs. 
3   → Tony:  stolen. 
4   (0.4) 
5 Marsha: stolen.=right out in front of my house. 
6 Tony:  oh: f'r crying out loud,… 
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(Schegloff, 1996, p. 75) 
 
However, in extract 1.16 line 3, we can see that Tony's turn consists of a 
single TCU of a single word. Yet this single word not only constitutes an entire turn, 
but it also performs three kinds of sequential work in the past, present and future. This 
is possible because interactants orient to a normative sequential framework, a holistic 
framework consisting of the interlocking organisations of turn-taking, sequence, 
preference and repair. Since the normative expectation is that a turn will perform 
these three kinds of sequential work, Tony can design his turn so that a single word is 
capable of doing so and Marsha can interpret it as doing so; this is the principle of 
reflexivity in action.  The evidence that the participants are actually orienting to the 
system described is in the next-turn proof procedure. Marsha analyses Tony's turn as 
commenting retrospectively on what happened to her car, as performing a new social 
action of confirming understanding of Marsha's news by summarising the content in a 
new linguistic format and as providing a context for her to take the sequence further. 
She displays her understanding of the work performed by his turn in her subsequent 
turn (line 5) by repeating his turn with the same intonation and adding further 
information on the theft.  
What is clear from the above discussion, then, is that TCUs are only 
analysable emically as social actions. They are quite heterogenous in terms of 
linguistic form and do not correspond in any way to single linguistic categories. 
However they are packaged in terms of linguistic form, the point is that social actors 
are able to recognise them in interaction as complete social actions (as we can see in 
line 5) and hence are able to project when they are likely to end. According to Ford 
and Thompson (1996, p. 171), the features of a turn which enable a speaker to project 
the end of a prior turn "must include not only syntactic cues but also intonational 
features as well as some notion of pragmatic or action completion… these three types 
of cues converge to a great extent to define transition relevance places in 
conversations, places to which conversationalists orient in sequencing their turns."  
So we can see that CA is not a system of etically specifiable units and rules to 
be followed in a regulative sense, like, for example, rules for the construction of a 
grammatically correct sentence. Much confusion may have arisen because Sacks et 
al.'s early works did use the terms unit and rule without explicating the difference 
between the CA and linguistic understandings of such terms. This may then have led 
to the belief that CA organisations were systems of units and rules in the descriptivist 
linguistic sense. However, CA does not have an etically specifiable unit of analysis in 
the sense in which this is understood in linguistics; it would be preferable to say that 
CA has an emic analytical focus on the sequence. In descriptivist linguistics it makes 
perfect sense to analyse a word or sentence in isolation. In CA, by contrast, it does not 
make any sense to analyse the turn stolen in extract 1.16 in isolation. Trying to 
identify the TCU or the turn as a unit of analysis misses the point; stolen is a social 
action embedded in a sequential environment. So in CA we are dealing with a holistic 
system of analysis and this is the case because the interactants are using the same 
holistic system of analysis themselves, as is made clear by Hutchby and Wooffitt. 
 
It is important to realise that it is not part of the conversation analyst's 
aim to define ... what a turn-construction unit is, as a linguist for instance 
may want to define what a sentence is. Conversation analysts cannot take 
a prescriptive stance on this question, because what a turn-construction 
unit consists of in any situated stretch of talk is a members' problem. That 
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is, such a unit is essentially anything out of which a legitimate turn has 
recognizably - for the participants - been built. (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 
1998, p. 48) 
 
This is clearly a very different approach to describing and analysing language to 
those used in linguistics. So the fundamental difference is that linguists attempt etic 
specifications of aspects of language itself whereas CA practitioners attempt emic 
analysis of how social actions are carried out by means of language. Nonetheless, 
participants in conversation clearly do not have great difficulty in identifying TCUs 
and projecting TRPs (i.e., in designing and recognising social actions) since, as 
already noted, exchange of turns is generally accomplished very efficiently. 
 The organisations of the adjacency pair, preference and turn-taking constitute 
the structural organisation of talk. However, the fourth element, repair, comes into 




Repair may be defined as the treatment of trouble occurring in interactive 
language use. Trouble is anything which the participants judge is impeding their 
communication and a repairable item is one which constitutes trouble for the 
participants. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1997, p. 363) point out that “nothing is, 
in principle, excludable from the class ‘repairable’”. From the ethnomethodological 
perspective it is a vital mechanism for the maintenance of reciprocity of perspectives 
and intersubjectivity. It is of particular importance for L2 learners and teachers to 
understand how breakdowns in communication and misunderstandings are repaired 
and we will see in Chapter 4 that repair in the L2 classroom tends to carry a heavier 
load than in other settings. It is important to distinguish self-initiated repair (I prompt 
repair of my mistake) from other-initiated repair (somebody else notices my mistake 
and initiates repair). Self-repair (I correct myself) must also be distinguished from 
other-repair (somebody corrects my mistake). There are therefore normally four repair 
trajectories: 
 




A:   had to put new gaskets on the oil pan to strop-stop the 
 leak 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 360) 
 




B: he had dis uh Mistuh W-m whatever k- I can't think of his first name, Watts on, 
the one that  wrote [ that piece 
A:               [ Dan Watts 
 
(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 364) 
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A:  hey the first time they stopped me from selling cigarettes was this morning. 
    (1.0) 
B: → from selling cigarettes? 
A: → from buying cigarettes. 
 
(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 370) 
 





C:  erm I’m just checking is that (.) right you know (0.5) I d- I don’t know 
  his flight number and [ I’m not sure 
A:            [ (whi-) 
C:  whether he’s coming in to channel four eh:  
  (.) 
A: → terminal four 
C:  yeah 
 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 63) 
 
Now there is a clear preference structure in the organisation of repair which 
corresponds with the above listing. This is that self-initiated self-repair is most 
preferred and other-initiated other-repair least preferred. This order also corresponds 
with frequency of usage in normal conversation, with other-initiated other-repair 
being rare17.  There are two kinds of evidence for the preference for self-repair. The 
first is the inherent structural bias, with the first two opportunities located in the 
speaker’s own turn – during the same turn-constructional unit and at the next 
transition relevance place. According to Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 66) “there 
are various ways in which turns are designed to facilitate self-repair, or display the 
speaker's sensitivity to the appropriateness of self-repair and the (possible) 
impropriety of other-repair." In the next two extracts we can see interactants making 





1 L:  but y'know single beds'r awfully thin to sleep on. 
2 S:  what? 
3 L:  single beds. [ they're- 
4 E:                  [ y'mean narrow? 
5 L:  they're awfully narrow yeah. 
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(Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 378) 
 
In extract 1.21 we can see the other speakers (S and E) moving down the 
preference structure in an attempt to repair the problem, which is that L has used a 
lexical item (thin) which does not collocate with bed. Since L does not appear to have 
noticed this problem in that there is no attempt at self-repair, in line 2 S uses the next-
preferred option, namely other-initiation of self-repair. However, S uses an 
‘open’(Drew, 1997) next-turn repair initiator (what?) which means that L does not 
appear to be able to locate the precise problem and seems in line 3 to be starting to 
repeat the whole of the initial utterance. Therefore, the other speakers are entitled to 
move further down the preference organisation and use other-initiated other-repair in 
line 4. However, note that the repair form is mitigated and shows affiliation as it is 
designed as a question.  Framing a correction as a question or confirmation check and 
offering an alternative is a useful strategy as it in effect gives first speaker the 
opportunity the opportunity to self-repair in the next turn. It is an affiliative action in 
that it portrays second speaker as orienting to and attempting to help first speaker. 
This mitigation of repair occurs in the L2 classroom as well as ordinary conversations. 
Other means of mitigation may include the use of jokes and markers such as I think. 
Since S and E have moved gradually down the preference organisation and mitigated 




1 A:   ... had to put new gaskets on the oil pan to strop-stop the 
2  leak, an' then I put- and then- 
3 R:   that was a gas leak. 
4 A:   it was an oil leak buddy. 
5 B:   't's a gas leak. 
6 A:   it's an oil leak. 
    ((dispute continues for many turns)) 
 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 360) 
 
By contrast, in extract 1.22 line 3, R immediately conducts other-initiated 
other-repair (i.e. the least preferred option) without any attempt to start higher up the 
preference organisation. Also note that there is no attempt at all at mitigation in the 
linguistic design (i.e. a bald statement) and in terms of an social action it is a flat 
contradiction. In line 4 we can see that A interprets this as a face-threatening, 
disaffiliative action in that A conducts unmitigated other-intiated other-repair on R’s 
turn; it is hence no surprise to find the dispute continuing for many turns. What we 
can see in the analysis of the above two extracts is that preference organisation must 
not be seen as a system of “rules” which must be followed; clearly in extract 1.22 the 
norms are not being followed. However, the point is that the normative preference 
system acts as an action template or point of reference which enables participants to 
display their level of affiliation to each other and to interpret each other’s actions. In 
line 3 R displays a lack of affiliation with A’s perspective precisely by going directly 
to the least preferred option. A’s response in line 4 demonstrates that A has 
interpreted this action, by reference to the preference organisation, as a display of 
complete disaffiliation and has therefore “retaliated” by a similar display of 
disaffiliation. 
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In section 1.6 we have characterised the different types of interactional 
organisation which work together in complementary fashion to create an architecture 
of intersubjectivity (Heritage 1984b, p. 254). They function as action templates or 
points of reference which interactants may use to orientate themselves in the pursuit 
of mutual understanding. A vital point is that these interactional organisations are not 
to be understood as rules, units or coding schemes in the sense in which these would 
be understood in a descriptivist linguistic paradigm. Rather, they are a set of 
normative resources which interactants make use of to display the meaning of their 
social actions to their partners and to interpret their partners' actions: 
 
In its first phase CA's conceptual apparatus was developed in its 
originators' struggle with the data, while in its second phase this 
apparatus is generally available as an established repertoire…The danger 
in this situation is that less talented, insightful or sensitive practitioners 
may be tempted to 'apply' the established concepts in a mechanistic 
fashion, as 'coding instruments'… In other words, the temptation is to use 
CA's previously established concepts and findings as law-like or even 
'causal' rules, whereas one should … see them as descriptions of possible 
normative orientations of participants, available for various usages as 
they see fit. (ten Have, 1999, p. 41) 
 
 Topic is a central concept in the analysis of talk and is co-constructed by 
participants during the course of the talk. However, it is not an interactional 
organisation and is not part of the context-free architecture of talk. Unlike the 
organisations of adjacency pairs and turn-taking, topic is not oriented to normatively. 
Topic is not treated at all in recent introductions to CA such as ten Have (1999) or 
Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998). However, it is extensively discussed by Sacks (1992).   
 
1.7 CA Procedures 
 
Having reviewed the basic components of interactional organisation, I will 
now explicate how these are used in the procedures of CA analysis. The first stage of 
CA analysis has been described as unmotivated looking or being open to discovering 
patterns or phenomena. Psathas (1995, pp. 24-25) describes the term unmotivated 
looking as a paradox "since looking is motivated or there would be no looking being 
done in the first place.”  So what is really meant is being open to discovering new 
phenomena rather than searching the data with preconceptions or hypotheses. For 
example, in my research in L2 classrooms (reported in section Error! Reference 
source not found.) the identification of teachers' avoidance of bald and unmitigated 
no in form and accuracy contexts emerged as a phenomenon from unmotivated 
looking rather than from a preconception that this was an issue which I should focus 
on. Having identified a candidate phenomenon, the next phase is normally an 
inductive search through a database to establish a collection of instances of the 
phenomenon. However, single case analysis can also be undertaken (Hutchby and 
Wooffitt, 1998, pp. 120-130).  
After an inductive database search has been carried out, the next step is to 
establish regularities and patterns in relation to occurrences of the phenomenon and to 
show that these regularities are methodically produced and oriented to by the 
participants as normative organizations of action (Heritage, 1988, p. 131). In order to 
explicate the emic logic or rational organisation of the pattern uncovered, the next 
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step is detailed analysis of single instances of the phenomenon. Deviant cases are seen 
to be particularly revealing since, as Heritage (1995, p. 399) puts it, they often serve 
to demonstrate the normativity of practices. Finally a more generalised account is 
produced of how the phenomenon relates to the broader matrix of interaction. For 
reasons of space we will not be illustrating inductive search procedures here, but in 
section 6.5 I briefly review an example from Schegloff (1968). Further examples may 
be found in Drew (1987), Heritage (1984a) and Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998).  
At this point is important to understand that what CA practitioners identify as 
a phenomenon is primarily an example of social action and they are not interested in it 
as a linguistic object as such. The phenomenon may indeed be a “superficially 
linguistic” item such as the marker oh (Heritage, 1984a) or a syntactical construction, 
such as the “you say X … what about Y” pattern (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, pp. 
104-109). However, they may be social actions identifiable by sequential placement, 
such as Drew's (1987) study of po-faced reactions to teases. The point to be made is 
that it is perfectly possible for researchers who are only interested in linguistic items 
to attempt to use CA to investigate such a “superficially linguistic” phenomenon in 
interaction. However, such an attempt would tend to reveal a lack of a conversation 
analytic mentality and would therefore tend to produce superficial results. There are a 
number of accounts of the procedures to be followed in CA analysis: Drew, 1994; 
Psathas, 1995; Ten Have, 1999. The following account is a synthesis of the above 
accounts. This is an account of a single case analysis18 focussing on a single data 
extract. We start the account after recording, transcription and unmotivated looking 
have taken place and after we have identified a single extract to focus on. 
 
1) Locate an action sequence or sequences; 
2) Characterise the actions in the sequence or sequences. An action sequence can 
be as short as an adjacency pair or last for hours. We are looking for a first 
speaker to initiate an action which is responded to in some way by a second 
speaker. This ends when the speakers move to perform a different action or series 
of actions. The idea of characterising the actions in the sequence may be termed 
form-function matching, speech act analysis or Discourse Analysis (DA) in 
Levinson's (1983) terms. So we may, for example, identify a sequence in which an 
offer is made and then rejected or a complex sequence of embedded question and 
answer adjacency pairs (e.g. Levinson, 1983, p. 305). It should be noted here that 
form-function analysis has always been an integral part of CA (even in Sack's first 
lecture) and that DA is in effect an integral part of CA (see section Error! 
Reference source not found.). However, a major difference is that CA reveals 
and portrays the fact that utterances often perform several actions simultaneously 
and are specifically designed to do so (Levinson, 1983, p. 311) so a CA analysis 
will portray the multiplexity of actions performed by an utterance whereas a DA 
analysis normally “translates” an utterance into a single function.  
3) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of the organisation of turn-taking, 
focussing especially on any disturbances in the working of the system. 
4) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of sequence organisation. Here we 
are looking at adjacency pairs and preference organisation but more widely at any 
action undertaken in response to other actions. 
5) Examine the action sequence(s) in terms of the organisation of repair. 
6) Examine how the speakers package their actions in terms of the actual 
linguistic forms which they select from the alternatives available and consider the 
significance of these. We are in effect returning here to form-function analysis, 
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but this time we are focussing on the forms which are used to manifest the 
functions. Going back to extracts 1.3 and 1.4, for example, we noted there that 
actors repeated questions in increasingly short and curt forms and that this 
displayed a change in orientation. 
7)  Uncover any roles, identities or relationships which emerge in the details of the 
interaction. As noted in section 1.5, CA normally tries to avoid making 
(premature) reference to background information such as institutional setting, 
personal details (age, gender etc.) until after the initial analysis. This is so it can be 
established which particulars are demonstrably relevant to the actors in the 
interaction i.e. that these particulars are manifest in some way in the details of the 
interaction; this may take many different forms; see section 1.8 below. Stages 1-7 
would be followed whether one were analysing ordinary conversation or 
institutional interaction. In the case of institutional interaction, one would move 
from Stage 7 onto other issues, as will be seen in section Error! Reference source 
not found..  
8)  Having completed a preliminary analysis which portrays the interactional 
organisation and the participants' orientations, an attempt is now made to locate 
this particular sequence within a bigger picture. Of course, how this is done 
depends on what has been uncovered in the analysis. However, we are looking for 
a rational specification of the sequence which can uncover its emic logic and the 
machinery which produced it and which places it in a wider matrix of interaction; 
an example of this is provided in chapter 5. What we see in CA methodology is 
constant, reflexive interaction between the specific instance and the underlying 
machinery. So specific episodes are analysed by reference to types of interactional 
organisation (adjacency pairs, etc.) whilst particular instances help us to further 
elaborate the underlying machinery.  
 
1.8 Attitude to Context 
 
 CA has a dynamic, complex, highly empirical perspective on context19. The 
basic aim is to establish an emic perspective, i.e. to determine which elements of 
context are relevant to the interactants at any point in the interaction. The perspective 
is also an active one in which participants talk a context into being. The perspective is 
dynamic in that, as Heritage  (1984b, p. 242) puts it, “The context of a next action is 
repeatedly renewed with every current action” and is transformable at any moment.  A 
basic assumption of CA is that contributions to interaction are context-shaped and 
context-renewing. Contributions are context-shaped in that they cannot be adequately 
understood except by reference to the sequential environment in which they occur and 
in which the participants design them to occur. Contributions are context-renewing in 
that they create a sequential environment or template in which a next contribution will 
occur. This view of utterances as context-shaped and context-renewing can be traced 
back to the ethnomethdological principle of reflexivity. The principle of indexicality 
of utterances is clearly  incorporated in the CA view of context and utterances clearly 
document the participants' understanding of context.  
 CA sees the underlying machinery which generates interaction as being both 
context-free and context-sensitive: The structural organisations (e.g. turn-taking) can 
be seen as the context-free resources in that their organisation can be specified as a 
series of norms in isolation from any specific instance of interaction. Nonetheless, the 
application of these organisations is context-sensitive in that interactants use the 
organisation of (for example) turn-taking to display their understanding of context. So 
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professionals and lay clients may talk an institutional context into being through the 
professional taking control of the turn-taking system; we understand this by reference 
to the context-free norms. By tracing how the context-free resources are employed 
and manifested locally in a context-sensitive manner, we are able to uncover the 
underlying machinery. As Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, p. 36) put it, “The aim of 
conversation analysis … is to explicate the structural organization of talk in 
interaction at this interface between context-free resources and their context-sensitive 
applications."  Extract 1.24 exemplifies how this is undertaken.  
CA employs a highly empirical, bottom-up approach to the specification of 
context. According to Schegloff (1987, p. 221), much CA work “can be seen as an 
extended effort to elaborate just what a context is and what its explication or 
description might entail.” Evidence for the characterisation of a context has to derive 
primarily from the orientations of the participants as documented in the details of the  
interactional data rather than from a description of the physical setting or the 
participants. The key to understanding why CA insists on being so tightly empirical is 
that the aim is to develop an emic perspective on how the participants display to each 
other their understanding of the context. Clearly this cannot be achieved by analysts 
etically deciding which aspects of context they think are relevant, particularly as there 
are an infinite number of potentially relevant contextual details which could be 
invoked. We can see an example of how contextual features can become relevant in 




407 L10:  oh I see (.) I see the chinese is uh (.) sanku 
408  (0.6-0.9) 
409 L11:  unh? 
410 L10:  sanku 
411  (.) 
412 L9:    what 
413 L10:  c [ orals 
414 L11:       [ corals 
415 L9:    corals oh okay 
 
(Markee, 2000, p. 27) 
 
In this case L10's and L11's ethnic/linguistic identity as Chinese native 
speakers (L9 is from a different ethnic/linguistic background) becomes available and 
relevant to CA analysis since this is made relevant in the details of the interaction 
through L10 producing the Chinese translation of ‘corals’ and L10 and L11 then 
translating it back into English. 
The final aspect to the complex CA perspective on context is that sequences 
of actions are seen as a major part of what we mean by context and that “modes of 
interactional organisation might themselves be treated as contexts” (Schegloff, 1987, 
p. 221).  This point will be illustrated in the discussion of the extract below, in which 
we conclude this section on context by demonstrating how all of these different 
elements cohere. Whereas static and monolithic approaches to discourse regard 
institutional context as something given, fixed  and located in the background, CA 
adopts a dynamic view of context as endogenous to the talk, “showing that the 
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11       Dr F: doctor Hollmann told me something like 
12  you were running across the street not so 
13  completely dressed or something like that, 
14      Ms B: (h)yes: that's:- I am a child of God;= 
15  I am his child; 
16  (.) 
17 Ms B:     does a- does-= 
18                =do you have children doctor Fisch[er? 
19 Dr F:                [yes: 
20 Ms B:     yes what age, 
21 Dr F:      uh around s-seven eight  [ and eleven 
22 Ms B:            [ yes and when they 
23       were small these children, 
24 Dr F:      yes [ :, 
25 Ms B:           [ didn't they sometimes run around naked 
26                [ because they don't yet - because they 
27 Dr F:      [ t(hh) u(h) 
28 Ms B:     don't (.) know that they must not do that. yes and in the same way:                  
29         you have to see that in my relationship to God   
 
(Bergmann, 1992, p. 149 (translated from German)) 
 
 The above extract demonstrates why such a complex approach to context is 
necessary. A static, top-down, etic approach to context would work from the 
background contextual information regarding the psychiatrist, patient and the 
institutional setting (mental hospital). However, the extract demonstrates the need for 
a dynamic, empirical, emic, bottom-up approach rooted in the details of the 
interaction. Although the interaction starts off in lines 11-13 with the professional 
questioning the patient, the “context” is immediately transformed as the patient poses 
a number of questions to the professional (who answers them) in order to lead the 
professional (in a Socratic manner) to a new insight in lines 29 and 30. It is the 
interactional organisation which has fundamentally changed during the course of the 
dialogue and hence a significant element of the “context”, even though the 
background factors remain constant. This why CA proposes that organisations of the 
interaction can be treated as contexts and that the participants “talk contexts into 
being”. Ms B's contributions from line 18 are context-shaped in that they have to be 
understood in the context of the pychiatrist's previous turn, but they are context-
renewing in that they talk a different context into being. The organisation of turn-
taking and adjacency pairs are context-free resources and function as norms. It is by 
reference to these norms that we can understand that Ms B is subverting the 
previously established context through her use of the organisation of turn-taking and 
adjacency pairs in a context-sensitive way. 
 
1.9 Ethnomethodological CA and “Linguistic” CA 
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As a generalisation, CA methodology has often been misunderstood by 
linguists and the reasons for this are quite easy to trace. Firstly, sociologists have 
rarely tried to explain the ethnomethodological principles on which CA is based in 
terms which are comprehensible to linguists, or indeed to anyone outside sociology. 
By contrast, the interactional organisations of turn-taking, adjacency pairs, preference 
organisation and repair are readily comprehensible and very useful to linguists. So it 
is in a sense quite natural that introductory texts on discourse analysis for linguists 
(e.g. Burns 2001; Cameron 2001; Cook 1989; McCarthy 199120;) should have 
introduced the above types of interactional organisation without explication of the 
ethnomethodological principles which revealed them. 
Linguists reading such accounts of the organisations might legitimately 
assume by default that they were a system of units and rules in the linguistic sense and 
that they were the methodology of CA. By contrast, a brief introduction for social 
scientists (Bryman, 2001) starts with the principles of reflexivity and indexicality and 
introduces the interactional organisations as “tools for research”. It should be noted 
that Sacks et al. (1974) presented their model of turn-taking in a linguistics journal 
without explicating the ethnomethodological principles on which their work was 
based or the ways in which it differed from linguistics. It is again easy to understand 
how the confusion has arisen. In any case, there is now a common misconception 
among linguists that doing CA is a matter of transcribing talk and then identifying or 
coding patterns of turn-taking, adjacency pairs, preference organisation and repair, 
with the ethnomethodological principles and the dimension of social action entirely 
absent. Cameron's (2001) introduction to CA demonstrates how serious this 
misconception has become amongst linguists. Having introduced the CA model of 




A:   and she didn't she didn't like Katie she didn't ge[t on with Katie at all      ] 
B:                                                                               [no she didn't get on with] Katie 
 
(Cameron, 2001, p. 92) 
 
Cameron reinforces this by reference to similar observations in two other 
publications and concludes that 
 
The simplest systematics model assumes that 'one at a time' is both 
normal and fundamental: there is no obvious place in the model for 
simultaneous speech which is neither an error nor a violation, but merely 
a normal feature of certain kinds of talk. The question this raises is 
whether Sacks and colleagues make assumptions about talk-in-general 
which are not, in fact, universally valid… if the analyst's claim is that 
'one speaker speaks at a time', one would expect participants in talk to 
display their orientation to that pattern by treating instances of 
simultaneous speech as problems requiring repair… But in … the 
conversation… reproduced above, there is no display of orientation to the 
'one speaker speaks at a time' pattern, and this is what motivates 
speculation that some other system of floor organization may be 
operative. (Cameron, 2001, p. 93) 
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Readers who have followed the argument in this chapter, however, will realise 
that we need to see the turn-taking model as a constitutive norm which interactants 
make use of to display the meaning of their social actions to their partners and to 
interpret their partners' actions. First of all we will treat Cameron's point in general 
terms. It is indeed common for close friends, family and associates to use overlap and 
simultaneous speech and this may be significant social action, although this would 
have to be explicated on a case by case basis. As Schegloff (2000a, p. 48) puts it, 
"Specific action … outcomes are co-constructed by reference to one-party-at-a-time, 
even though they are realized through designedly simultaneous talk." It is quite 
common for preferred second turns such as acceptance of an invitation or agreement 
(as in extract 1.25 above and also extract 1.26 below) to be undertaken in overlap 




A: why don't you come up and see me some[ times 
B:                [ I would like to 
 
(Atkinson & Drew, 1979, p. 58) 
 
The point is that it may be precisely by reference to the TRP and the norms 
of turn-taking that close friends and family index their degree of agreement and 
affiliation and talk a relationship of intimacy and a context of informality into being. 
In some cases it may be that the earlier one delivers the preferred action, the greater 
one's display of unquestioning support for and affiliation to one's partner. Similarly, it 
may be precisely by reference to the norms of turn-taking and to the TRP that we 
display disaffiliation and prefigure a dispreferred action, for example if B had left a 
very long silence before answering A.  
However, the point of CA is to analyse data, so we will apply the 
fundamental CA questions to Cameron's data: why does overlap occur in extract 1.25 
in exactly that way (i.e. in those linguistic forms) at exactly that point? The first thing 
we notice is that A extends her turn after the first transition relevance place (the first 
mention of Katie) and repeats the same basic social action. She twice presents an 
opinion about the relationship between the unnamed “she” and Katie, or proffers this 
as topic in Schegloff's (1996, p. 58) terms: "It is a recurrent feature of such sequences 
that two tries or proffers are put forward, each of which can be taken up and embraced 
or declined by its recipient". The next thing that we note is that it is not an exact 
repetition. The first opinion "she didn't like Katie" is uni-directional and rather 
stronger than the second opinion "she didn't get on with Katie" which presents the 
lack of social harmony as more of a two-way problem.  At the first transition 
relevance place (the first mention of Katie), B could have performed some kind of 
agreement. However, as this is not forthcoming at that point, A extends the turn and 
repackages the same basic point in order to downgrade the degree of social 
disharmony implied. This creates an additional opportunity for B to give an affiliative 
response.  
As Ford and Thompson (1996, p. 167) explain: "Turn extensions in our data 
are regularly geared towards … creating or modifying relevance for another speaker's 
response. In pursuing recipient responses, speakers may … soften some claim ... thus 
revising the context for agreement or disagreement." Note that B's action of 
agreement starts in overlap at precisely the earliest possible moment at which B can 
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recognise what A is about to say and recognise that it is a downgrade and therefore an 
assessment which she can agree with the second time round. We know that B has 
recognised what A was going to say at that moment because of the next-turn proof 
procedure. That is, B actually produces the same grammatical structure as A, even 
though they are talking in overlap. By withholding agreement at the first TRP, B has 
created a slight disaffiliation between herself and A. A then makes an affiliative 
action by modifying her opinion and creates a fresh opportunity for B to agree. As 
soon as B can recognise this, she displays the degree of her enthusiasm for agreeing 
with the modified opinion and hence for restoring her affiliation with A precisely by 
delivering the action at the earliest possible point in overlap.  Why does B use exactly 
those linguistic forms? The no documents agreement. By adopting exactly the same 
linguistic forms as A, B again displays the degree of her agreement with A. This also 
points to another motivation for the overlap starting at that exact point. According to 
Lerner:  
 
At times participants may speak in a fashion that reveals that they are 
aiming to simultaneously co-produce part or all of a turn-constructional 
unit more or less in unison with another participant, by recognizably 
attempting to do such things as match the words, voicing and tempo of 
the other speaker… Choral co-production can be employed by an 
addressed recipient of a turn to demonstrate agreement with what is being 
said. (Lerner, 2002, pp. 226 & 237).  
 
Choral co-production, then, can be a powerful means of displaying the 
degree of one's empathy with another and in this case could only be accomplished by 
B starting her turn in overlap as early as possible. The two-line extract is also rather 
intriguing as it demonstrates how the interactants negotiate their degree of affiliation 
to each other at the same time as they are negotiating as topic the state of affiliation 
between two acquaintances. 
The stated aim of Cameron's (2001) introduction to CA is to provide "a 
grounding in the practical techniques of (CA (among other approaches)) and how to 
apply them to real data." It is therefore disappointing that Cameron fails to analyse her 
data using a CA methodology and instead presents them as having "no obvious place 
in the model" of turn-taking (2001, p. 93). The degree of B's agreement is indexed by 
and documented by the timing of the overlap as well as by its linguistic formatting. In 
other words, the interactants perform their social actions precisely by normative 
reference to the model of turn-taking. The interactional organisations themselves are 
context-free, but the vital point is that participants employ these context-free 
organisations in a context-sensitive way to display their social actions. It is because 
the participants (and we as analysts) are able to identify the gap between the context-
free model and its context-sensitive implementation that they (and we as analysts) are 
able to understand the social significance of the context-sensitive implementation. 
Cameron (2001) is representative of several short introductions to linguistic CA21 and 
demonstrates how wide the gulf has now become between linguistic CA and  
ethnomethodological CA. Taking Cameron (2001) as the archetype, the typical 
features of introductions to linguistic CA are as follows: 
 
• No representative examples of actual CA analysis are provided. 
• There is no mention of any of the ethnomethodological principles which are 
the fundamentals of CA methodology. 
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• The reader is likely to form the impression that interactional organisations are 
the methodology of CA and are a system of units and rules to be applied 
etically in the same way as in a descriptivist linguistics approach. 
• There is no indication that participants employ these context-free interactional 
organisations in a normative, context-sensitive way to display their social 
actions. 
• Hence the reflexive connection between social action and language is entirely 
absent. 
 
It is therefore no surprise that many linguistics students now believe doing 
CA to mean producing a detailed transcription and then merely identifying instances 
of turn-taking, adjacency pairs, preference and repair; there is description of 
superficial linguistic features rather than an analysis of social action. Linguistic CA is 
basically CA minus the methodology; a kind of coding scheme. Metaphorically, it 
presents the reader with a Porsche which has had a lawn-mower engine put in it 
instead. It may have the same name badge and bodywork and crawl forward in the 
same direction after a fashion, but the power is no longer there. 
We should consider whether there is any fundamental objection to having two 
alternative versions of CA. In my view there is no crucial problem provided that the 
two versions are separated, defined and named differently. Linguists will no doubt 
continue to find it useful to etically employ the interactional organisations as a coding 
scheme in a descriptivist linguistic paradigm. Provided that it is recognised that this is 
linguistic CA and is different to doing CA analysis, I cannot see any fundamental 
objection. This separation and re-naming would avoid the current problem which does 
seem to me to be very serious. This is the current blurring between the two versions 
which gives the impression to many linguists that ethnomethodological CA is also an 
underpowered, etic coding scheme. So, for example, we saw above that Cameron's 
introduction to CA suggests that CA is unable to handle straightforward data, whereas 
the ethnomethodological version is perfectly capable of doing so. The term 'CA' 
should be reserved for the original ethnomethodological version and ‘linguistic CA' 
for the linguistic version. A further problem caused by the current blurred situation is 
that sociological CA practitioners occasionally express a degree of frustration with a 
common belief among linguists that they understand CA when what they have 
actually encountered is the linguistic version. It is therefore possible that formalising a 
separation between the two versions would lead to greater clarity and understanding 
between all parties involved. 
In this chapter I have introduced the fundamentals of CA methodology in 
relation to ordinary conversation. In Chapter 2, I introduce CA methodology in 
relation to institutional discourse in general and in Chapters 3 to 6, CA is applied to 
L2 classroom interaction in particular. In chapter 7 we will revisit CA as a social 
science research methodology in relation to issues such as validity, reliability, 
generalisability, quantification, and triangulation. 
A number of typical criticisms of CA are that it refuses to use available 
theories of human conduct, is unwilling to invoke "obvious" background contextual 
features and is obsessed with "trivial" detail. The “units of analysis” are alleged to be 
unclear and unreliable and it is said that interactants often do not follow the “rules” 
specified by CA. It is hoped that this chapter has clarified the CA position in relation 
to all of these issues and has explained the coherent rationale underlying CA 
methodology.  
 
  34 
 
 
1.10 Chapter Summary 
  
In this chapter I have illustrated the basic principles of Conversation 
Analysis (CA) using extracts from ordinary conversation. The chapter explained the 
relationship between ethnomethodology and CA, outlining five fundamental 
principles which underlie ethnomethodology and hence CA. After outlining the aims 
and principles of CA, I introduced the interactional organisations of sequence 
(adjacency pairs), preference, turn-taking and repair. I then explained the typical 
analytical procedures followed in CA and introduced the CA perspective on context. 
The chapter concluded with the argument that a “linguistic” version of CA has 
diverged from ethnomethodological CA.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The terms language classroom and L2 classroom refer to any classrooms in which languages other 
than the mother tongue of the students is taught. 
2
 See Heritage (1984b). 
3
 See, however, Levinson (1983). 
4
 The discussion is based on Heritage (1984b); Boyle (1997); Hutchby and Wooffit (1998); Ten Have 
(1999).  
5
 Parsons (1937). 
6
 These principles originate in Boyle (1997); Garfinkel (1967); Heritage (1984b). 
7
 A schema is a hypothetical mental framework for portraying memorised generic concepts. See Cook 
(1989, p. 69). See section 6.3 for the CA perspective on socially distributed cognition. It is important to 
note that CA does not ‘psychologise’ about participants’ cognitive states nor discuss structures such as 
schemata; here I am merely pointing to a similarity. 
8
 In section 1.8 we noted that ethnographic or contextual information could only be invoked in the 
analysis if it was evident in the details of the interaction that the participants were orienting to it. 
However, many extracts in this monograph start with ethnographic or contextual information. Indeed, 
this is common practice in relation to institutional discourse, with the majority of chapters in Drew and 
Heritage (1992) starting with some kind of contextual information. The apparent contradiction can be 
explained by the difference between process and product. The process is that described in section 1.8. 
However, in order to turn technical CA analyses into publishable work, the analyses need to be made 
readable and to follow standard academic conventions. Therefore, it is almost always necessary for the 
published work ‘product’ to start by supplying information necessary to the reader and to employ terms 
in the transcript such as ‘teacher’, ‘judge’ etc. 
9
 Taking sanctions means expressing righteous hostility on a social level, e.g., by snubbing someone. 
10
 See section 6.3 for a discussion of the CA perspective on socially distributed cognition. 
11
 Although gaze and non-verbal communication can be included in the analysis. 
12
 This paragraph uses a number of terms derived from Second Language Acquisition as a convenient 
shorthand. I would like to thank an anonymous Language Learning reviewer for pointing out that CA 
can also be used to problematise such terms, as indeed I do in chapter 6. 
13
 Indeed, Schegloff and Sacks (1973) published on adjacency pairs before turn-taking and repair. 
14
 Taking sanctions means expressing righteous hostility on a social level. Extract 1.4 shows Child 
sanctioning Mother, which demonstrates why social categories cannot be accepted a priori as 
immutable constructs. 
15
 See Heritage (1984b, p.260) for further discussion. 
16
 See note 55 in relation to face and politeness. 
17
 This finding is based on American English and may not apply to all cultures or languages. 
18
  See Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998, pp.120-130). 
19
 The discussion is intended as an introduction for non-practitioners. Within CA, the treatment of 
context is one of the most controversial topics and a variety of conceptions are expressed. Since one of 
the aims of this monograph is to emphasise elements of compatibility with other research 
methodologies, my conception of context is more broadly conceived. The reader is referred to Duranti 
& Goodwin (1992) and Sarangi & Roberts (1999). 
  35 
                                                                                                                                            
20
 McCarthy does not claim to be introducing CA. 
21
 This is not to imply that all introductions to CA written by linguists constitute linguistic CA. 
Levinson (1983) and Markee (2000) are linguists, but base their accounts on ethnomethodological 
principles. 
